This paper exploits the early exercise premium representation to investigate strategic investment policies in a duopolistic continuous-time real options game. Assuming exogenous …rm roles, we …nd that (i) as the leader installs its newly purchased capital, the follower's optimal investment policy displays a monotonically decreasing pattern, which …nds its justi…cation in the temporary reallocation of the leader's revenues to its competitor, and (ii) once the leader has completed its investment process, the follower's trigger boundary is proportional to the …xed cost of investment weighted by the present value of future revenues per unit of market demand. Moreover, we demonstrate that the follower's willingness to delay investment is enhanced by a longer time-to-build and a more volatile market demand, while it is weakened by a higher quality improvement upon replacement and by a higher expected growth in market demand. Finally, we study the probability that the follower mimics the leader's decision within the leader's time-to-build window.
Introduction
Over the recent years, the merged theory of real options and strategic …rm interactions within the game-theoretical paradigm has gained signi…cant in ‡uence among both academic researchers and management practitioners. The broad appeal of this literature lies in its recognition of three distinctive features of corporate investment decisions: (i) the initial investment cost is largely sunk, which makes the investment decision often irreversible, (ii) the future stream of pro…ts upon investing is uncertain and it is a¤ected by the behavior of the …rm's competitors, and (iii) the timing of investment is at the discretion of the …rm's decision-makers. The interaction of these three attributes results in an isomorphism between a …rm's real investment projects and a set of …nancial positions in American options, which permits the application of some of the most advanced techniques developed in contingent claims analysis. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a standard textbook treatment of real investment decisions under uncertainty such as new entry, determination of the initial scale of the …rm, temporary shutdown and restart, and permanent exit. The survey article by Boyer, Gravel and Lasserre (2004) attempts to collect the most notable contributions to the literature on strategic investment games, from the pioneering works of Gilbert and Harris (1984) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to more recent contributions. Huisman, Kort, Pawlina and Thijssen (2003) o¤er a representative treatment of real options within the gametheory framework: in particular, they extend the work of Smets (1991) by applying a method involving symmetric mixed strategies and they review previous models featuring asymmetric …rms as well as decreasing uncertainty over time. Grenadier (1996) develops an equilibrium model for the optimal investment timing of two symmetric …rms competing in the real estate market. Working backwards in a dynamic programming fashion, Grenadier determines the optimal exercise policies for his duopoly model and provides a rational explanation for overbuilding in the real estate market. Huisman and Kort (1998) adapt the Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) framework to analyze technology adoption assuming a stochastic time-tobuild delay. They consider dispersed versus joint equilibria in the case of endogenous …rms' roles and they …nd that the pro…t stream belonging to the preemption equilibrium can be so low that both …rms would be better o¤ never exercising their capital-replacement option.
In parallel with the adoption of the option methodology for the analysis of real investment decisions, much e¤ort has been devoted to the study of American options. This research has provided sophisticated instruments that facilitate the characterization of the option's optimal exercise policy. In particular, building on the seminal work of Samuelson (1965) and McKean (1965) , Kim (1990) , Jacka (1991) and Carr, Jarrow, and Myneni (1992) derive a powerful decomposition of the American option value that emphasizes the premium attached to early exercise. The early exercise premium (EEP) representation expresses an American option as the combination of a European option and the right to exercise the option early. This representation is central to the analysis of American-style derivatives in the recent book by Detemple (2006) . Ru¢ no and Treussard (2006) examine strategic investment in the context of a duopolistic continuous-time real options game and derive a set of economic and mathematical conditions under which both …rms optimally retain their investment option forever. In this article, we depart from those benchmark conditions to describe active strategic interactions, as those observed daily in the real world. We consider an economy populated by two symmetric …rms, each holding a unique capital-replacement option over an in…nite horizon. Until one of the two …rms exercises its capital-replacement option, both …rms operate the same technology. Upon exercising its investment option, a …rm is endowed with a full stock of higher-quality productive capital. Since each …rm's investment opportunity is unique and indivisible, this economy is characterized by lumpy investment. We recognize that, under …xed costs of investment and time-to-build, a …rm's exercise of its capital-replacement option leads not only to a temporary "loss of output associated with the acquisition and installation of new capital goods (Cooper et al. 1999, p. 923) " but also to a signi…cant temporary reallocation of the …rm's revenues to its competitor. Upon exercising its investment option, the …rm pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to its competitor in the form of transferred foregone consumer demand. To characterize each …rm's optimal exercise policy we rely on the early exercise premium (EEP) representation.
We …nd that, conditional on the leader having completed its capital-replacement process, the investment trigger boundary for the follower is proportional to the adjusted …xed cost of investment, which we de…ne as the actual …xed cost of investment weighted by the present value of future revenues per unit of market demand. This result enables us to conduct comparative statics on the follower's investment initiation boundary, which demonstrate that the follower's willingness to delay investment is enhanced by a longer time-to-build and a more volatile market demand, while it is weakened by a higher quality improvement upon replacement as well as by a higher expected growth in market demand. In addition, we show that the value of the follower's capital-replacement option monotonically increases with current market demand, regardless of the technological enhancement achieved upon investment and it becomes more valuable as the quality of the newly installed capital rises, this latter e¤ect being magni…ed by higher market demand levels. We devote special attention to the near linearity of the option's value along the market demand dimension, which at …rst may appear at variance with the well-established convexity properties of plain-vanilla contingent claims. This peculiarity re ‡ects the relative contribution of the present value of the …rm's revenues prior to investment to the overall value of the investment option.
During the interim in which the leader does not operate in the market, the follower's optimal investment policy solves a non-linear recursive integral equation, which we derive via numerical methods. We obtain a monotonically decreasing pattern for the follower's boundary over time, which …nds its justi…cation in the temporary reallocation of the leader's revenues to its competitor. This, in turn, motivates the follower's increasing willingness to initiate its capital-replacement process as the opportunity cost of investment, in terms of foregone monopoly pro…ts, declines over time.
Finally, we solve the leader's problem and we determine, via comparative statics, the probability that the follower mimics the leader's decision within the leader's time-to-build window. Because all the expressions relevant to the pricing of the leader's investment option are identical to those of the follower's, we …nd that the leader's trigger boundary as well as the value of its option to invest coincide with those of the follower's. We de…ne the probability of an investment cluster as the probability that the follower emulates the leader in its investment decision within the leader's time-to-build window. We conclude that, while added market uncertainty reduces the probability of an investment cluster, a higher quality advancement upon investment, a higher growth rate in market demand, and a longer timeto-build, all make it more likely for the follower to exercise its investment option promptly.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model: we adopt the stochastic process for market demand as well as the Markovian revenue equations of Ru¢ no and Treussard (2006) . In Section 3 we apply the standard Stackelberg mechanism for subgame perfect equilibria to derive the trigger boundary for the low-quality producer. In Section 4 we solve the leader's problem and we determine via comparative statics the probability that the follower mimics the leader's decision within the leader's time-to-build window. In Section 5 we summarize the results of the paper. Mathematical derivations are collected in an Appendix (Section 6) and the Matlab code implemented to obtain the numerical results presented in the body of this article is compiled in Section 7.
The Model
In this Section we review the stochastic process for market demand and the Markovian revenue equations from Ru¢ no and Treussard (2006) . In addition, we demonstrate the consistency of our assumptions with the results of Grossman and Helpman's (1991) model of sequential quality improvements.
We consider an in…nite-horizon economy populated by two …rms. At time t = 0, …rm ii 2 f1; 2g -produces y i = units of output. At time t i , …rm i initiates its capital-replacement process, which leads the new capital of quality ( > 1 is a quality factor common across …rms) to be operational at time t i + , where is a strictly positive time-to-build delay. At time t i + , …rm i is endowed with , a full stock of higher-quality productive capital. We denote y i;t = k i;t as …rm i's output capacity at time t. The aggregate quantity produced is given by
The inverse demand function for this commodity is given by
where @D(Y ) @Y < 0 and X t is an exogenous demand-shock process that obeys
We account for quality improvement by assuming that the adoption of the new technology allows the …rm to sell its output at a per-unit price equal to P t . As we shall see, this feature of the model is pivotal in proving the consistency of our assumptions with Grossman and Helpman's results. In this economy, the time-discount rate is a constant r > > 0 so that that the present value discount factor is
Until one of the two …rms exercises its capital-replacement option, both …rms operate the same technology. Since each …rm's investment opportunity is unique and indivisible, this economy is characterized by lumpy investment. We assume, without loss of generality, that …rm 1 is the …rst …rm to exercise its investment option, i.e. …rm 1 is the Stackelberg 1 leader. At time t 1 , …rm 1 suspends its production operations and pays a …xed cost I.
The instantaneous revenues for …rm 1, R 1 (t) = k 1;t P t , follow
On the other hand, the ‡ow of revenues for …rm 2, R 2 (t) = k 2;t P t , follows
Equation (5) embodies our paper's economic recognition that, under …xed costs of investment and time-to-build, a …rm's exercise of its capital-replacement option leads not only to a temporary "loss of output associated with the acquisition and installation of new capital goods (Cooper et al. 1999, p. 923) " but also to a signi…cant temporary reallocation of the …rm's revenues to its competitor. Upon exercising its investment option, the …rm pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to its competitor in the form of transferred foregone consumer demand. This e¤ect is captured by the fact that
is monotonically decreasing in Y . Throughout the remainder of this article we assume a speci…c functional form for the market demand D(Y t ). In particular, we adopt the form D(Y t ) = Y t , where is the constant inverse elasticity parameter taking values in the interval (0; 1).
We conclude this Section by validating our modeling assumptions: more speci…cally, we demonstrate the consistency of the revenue streams in Eqs. (4) and (5) with the results of Grossman and Helpman's model of sequential quality improvement. Grossman and Helpman develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors, in which each product follows a stochastic progression up a quality ladder. Consumers share a common intertemporal utility function, which they maximize subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. At every point in time the maximization occurs in two stages: …rst, the consumer allocates her ‡ow of spending to maximize the instantaneous utility for given prices and then she chooses the time pattern of spending to maximize her intertemporal utility function. To solve the static problem, the consumer optimally selects a bundle of products with equal quality-adjusted prices. 2 In their model, progress is not uniform across sectors and in equilibrium the distribution of qualities evolves over time. 1 Stackelberg (1934) proposes a dynamic model of duopoly in which a dominant …rm (or leader) moves …rst and a subordinate …rm (or follower) moves second. For a classic textbook treatment of the Stackelberg game the reader is referred to Myerson (2004, p. 187) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 67-69) .
2 See Grossman and Helpman (1991, pp. 45-46) for mathematical derivations. 
quality-adjusted price for high-quality producer
quality-adjusted price for low-quality producer :
Equation (6) proves that quality-adjusted prices are equal across …rms, which is consistent with the results of Grossman and Helpman's model of quality improvements.
The Follower' s Optimal Investment Behavior
Since …rm 1 is the …rst to invest in a new capital stock, we begin by determining the optimal policy for …rm 2 in a backward induction manner. Afterwards we solve …rm 1's optimal investment problem. This solution method follows the standard Stackelberg mechanism for subgame perfect equilibria, imposing sequentiality.
3
Consider the problem of …rm 2. Since …rm 1 has already exercised its capital-replacement option, we focus on times t t 1 , the investment initiation time for …rm 1. For any such t, …rm 2's value is equal to the value of one of the following two options: (i) an option to initiate the capital-replacement process between t 1 and t 1 + , whose value is denoted by F , and (ii) an option to initiate the investment process beyond time t 1 + , whose value is denoted by W . If unexercised at time t 1 + , the F option expires and is exchanged with the W option. Over the time interval t 1 t < t 1 + , the revenue stream for …rm 2 is equal to k 2;t [X t D(k 2;t )] while it is equal to k 2;t [X t D( 2 i=1 k i;t )] beyond t 1 + until the capital-replacement process is initiated (Eq. (5)).
Optimal Behavior Beyond t 1 +
Suppose that …rm 1 has already begun to produce using its new capital stock. The strategy space for …rm 2 is S t 1 + ;1 , the set of stopping times that take values between t 1 + and 1. For any t 2 2 S t 1 + ;1 , the value of the follower's capital-replacement option is given by
In Eq. (7) dH t is the ‡ow of instantaneous revenues received until the time of exercise, which is equal to
and EP t is the value of the future ‡ow of revenues earned beyond time t 2 + when the option to replace the …rm's capital is exercised at time t = t 2 . Equation (9) below contains the closed-form expression for EP t , the derivation of which is contained in the Appendix.
In what follows we rely on the early exercise premium (EEP) representation for American options to study strategic …rm behavior, as that embedded in Eq. (7). 4 The early exercise premium representation is parametric in that it expresses the American option value as a function of its unknown optimal exercise boundary. However, using the fact that immediate exercise is optimal when the boundary is reached, the EEP formula produces a recursive integral equation, which can be used to study the characteristics of the boundary. More speci…cally the EEP representation formula provides a decomposition of the American contingent claim into its European counterpart and the right to exercise the option early. 5 Accordingly, Eq. (7) can be represented as the sum of a European option and the early exercise premium, denoted EEP t . Hence, Eq. (7) becomes
where
in which v is the …rst time at which exercise becomes optimal. Detemple (2006, p. 43) provides intuition for the local gains from early exercise in Eq. (11): r [EP v I] dv is the amount of interest collected over time if one invests immediately and places the proceeds in the riskless account, dA v is the loss incurred by exercising early due to foregone expected appreciation in the payo¤s, and dH v is the loss due to foregone cash ‡ows earned prior to investment. The expected appreciation in payo¤s dA t follows from a standard application of Ito's Lemma to Eq. (9),
4 For a valuable textbook exposition of the valuation of American-style derivatives, the reader is referred to Detemple (2006) . 5 An alternative decomposition is the delayed exercise premium (DEP) representation, which emphasizes the gains from waiting to exercise. The DEP representation, developed by Carr, Jarrow, and Myneni (1992) , expresses the value of the American option as the sum of the payo¤s upon immediate exercise and the additional value of waiting. 6 See the proof of Theorem 34, p. 76 in Detemple (2006) .
Armed with an explicit formula for each of the components entering Eq. (11), we obtain the closed-form formula for EEP t as a function of the unknown optimal exercise boundary B. Substituting Eqs. (8), (9) and (12) into Eq. (11) yields
The object of the next Proposition is the provision of a pseudo closed-form solution to Eq. (13).
Proposition 2 The follower's early exercise premium, EEP t , is equal to
where ( ) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and
Proof. The crucial step in obtaining Eq. (14) is to replace the indicator function 1 f v =vg with the indicator function 1 fXv Bvg , which permits to integrate over the density function of X v . A complete proof of Eq. (14) is contained in the Appendix.
In the following Proposition, we evaluate the European component of the follower's option to invest, which, when combined with the result of Proposition 2, provides us with a pseudo closed-form formula for W t (EP; H; t 2 ) in terms of the unknown boundary B.
Proposition 3
The value of the European counterpart to the American contingent claim
which in turn determines the value of …rm 2's capital-replacement option to be
where d 1 is as in Proposition 2.
Proof. Evaluating the second term in Eq. (15) requires that we de…nẽ
the denominator of which is the present value of future revenues upon exercise per unit of market demand,
EPt Xt
, or demand multiplier. Accordingly, we refer toĨ as the adjusted …xed cost of investment per unit of demand multiplier. Making use of this newly-de…ned parameter, we can readily demonstrate that the second term in Eq. (15) vanishes as T approaches 1. The details of this proof are contained in the Appendix.
Since immediate exercise is optimal the …rst time the boundary is reached, Eq. (16) produces a recursive integral equation for the trigger boundary. Theorem 1 below states the value of the trigger boundary for the follower, which is proportional to the adjusted …xed cost of investmentĨ.
Theorem 1
The immediate exercise boundary for the follower beyond t 1 + is given by
Proof. Recognizing that, as T approaches 1, the immediate exercise boundary becomes time-independent, i.e., B = B 1 , is crucial to our derivation. In particular, it allows us to rewrite d 1 as
, which does not depend on the boundary. The integration over the time interval [t; 1) directly obtains by making use of the identity
resulting from the change of variable x = p 2au. The reader can …nd the detailed proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 enables us to conduct comparative statics on the follower's investment initiation boundary: Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the sensitivity of B 1 to changes in parameter values. In Figure 1 we present the e¤ects of jointly varying the quality-improvement factor and the time-to-build delay. Quality-Improvement Factor and Time-to-Build Delay Calibration: The …xed cost of investment, I, is set equal to 100. The drift, , and the volatility, , of the demand process are equal to 0:02 and 0:05 respectively. The time-discount rate, r, is 0:05, the concavity parameter, , is 0:8 and the capital stock, , is equal to 1000. Figure 1 shows that the follower's decision to initiate its capital-replacement process is insensitive to the length of the time-to-build delay when the quality-improvement upon replacement is expected to be large (e.g., = 1:5). Conversely, assuming a low quality enhancement factor (e.g., = 1:1), the follower's willingness to postpone investment increases as the time-to-build lag rises from six months to two years, which translates into the follower's need for a higher level of market demand to initiate its investment process. Overall, the follower's investment trigger boundary decreases monotonically as the quality-improvement factor becomes large. For example, for equal to one year, the boundary declines from approximately 40 ( = 1:1) to 5 ( = 1:5). Thus we conclude that the follower's reluctance to invest is higher the longer the time-to-build and the lower the quality-improvement factor.
In Figure 2 we consider the e¤ects of a higher expected demand growth rate, , and a higher market demand volatility, , on the follower's immediate exercise boundary. Calibration: The …xed cost of investment, I, is set equal to 100. The quality-improvement factor, , is 1.2. The time-to-build delay is set at = 1. The time-discount rate, r, is 0:05, the concavity parameter, , is 0:8 and the capital stock, , is equal to 1000. Figure 2 shows that higher demand growth rates lead to lower values for the follower's investment trigger boundary. Indeed, if the follower expects market demand to grow at a higher rate, a lower current market demand level is su¢ cient to induce it to exercise its capital-replacement option. Assuming a market demand volatility equal to 0.05, the boundary falls from 16 ( = 0:01) to 11 ( = 0:0495). Furthermore, Figure 2 reveals that higher market uncertainty increases the follower's reluctance to invest. When market demand is expected to grow at a rate equal to 0.02, the boundary rises from 13 ( = 0:01) to 18 ( = 0:15) . Hence, we conclude that the follower's willingness to postpone investment is reduced by a higher expected growth in market demand and it is strengthened by added market uncertainty.
The following Corollary provides the value of the follower's option conditional upon the leader having reentered the market with a full stock of higher-quality productive capital.
Corollary 1
The value of the follower's capital-replacement option at time t t 1 + is given by
Proof. The value of the follower's replacement option is obtained by replacing B v with B 1 =Ĩ 1 , as derived in Theorem 1, in Eq. (16) . This allows us to apply a formula often used to price perpetual American options (e.g., Kim, 1990 )
which leads to the direct obtention of Eq. (17). We next analyze the behavior of the follower's option value by conducting a set of comparative statics. Figure 3 displays the value of …rm 2's investment option as we vary the quality-improvement factor, , and the level of current market demand, X t . Quality-Improvement Factor and Demand Process
Calibration: The …xed cost of investment, I, is set equal to 100. The drift, , and the volatility, , of the demand process are equal to 0:02 and 0:05 respectively. The time-discount rate, r, is 0:05, the concavity parameter, , is 0:8 and the capital stock, , is equal to 1000. The time-to-build delay, , is equal to 1.
As Figure 3 reveals, the value of the follower's capital-replacement option monotonically increases with current market demand, regardless of the technological enhancement achieved upon investment. In addition, …rm 2's option to invest becomes more valuable as the quality of the newly installed capital rises, this latter e¤ect being magni…ed by higher market demand levels.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the surface displayed in Figure 3 is its near linearity along the market demand dimension, which may appear at variance with the well-established convexity properties of plain-vanilla contingent claims (e.g., Merton, 1973) . This peculiarity re ‡ects the relative contribution of the present value of the …rm's revenues prior to investment, E t R 1 t b t;v dH v , to the overall value of the investment option. Net of this component, the investment option displays an accentuated curvature, as shown in the left panel of Figure  4 .
Figure 4 Convexity Properties of the Follower' s Investment Option
Calibration: The …xed cost of investment, I, is set equal to 100. The drift, , and the volatility, , of the demand process are equal to 0:02 and 0:05 respectively. The time-discount rate, r, is 0:05, the concavity parameter, , is 0:8 and the capital stock, , is equal to 1000. The quality-improvement factor is equal to 1.2 and the time-to-build delay, , is equal to 1. Figure 4 illustrates numerically the degree of convexity of the follower's option as stated in Eq. (17) . For values of current market demand, X t , in the interval [0; B 1 ], the value of this option is equal to
which, for interpretive purposes, we rearrange as
Based on our calibration, 1 numerically dominates 2 , which delivers the approximate linearity displayed in the right panel of Figure 4 .
Having completed the study of the follower's behavior past the leader's time-to-build phase, we turn to the question of whether …rm 2 would replace its capital stock prior to t 1 + . Over this time interval the revenue stream for …rm 2 is equal to k 2;t [X t D(k 2;t )], as de…ned in Eq. (5).
Optimal Behavior Prior to t 1 +
Suppose that …rm 1 has not begun to produce with its newly purchased stock of capital. The strategy space for …rm 2 is S t 1 ;t 1 + , the set of stopping times that take values between t 1 and t 1 + . For any t 2 2 S t 1 ;t 1 + , the value of the follower's capital-replacement option is given by
in which
EP t is given by Eq. (9), and the last equality follows directly from the formula for the American option in Eq. (17) .
Proposition 4 below contains the exact form for the F option's early exercise premium, which is used to state the recursive equation for the option value. 
in which d 1 is as in Proposition 2.
Proof. In Eq. (18) Equation (20) provides us with the principal building block of the recursive integral equation that characterizes the follower's investment boundary, B t , for t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 + ]. Theorem 2 supplies the precise form of this recursive equation, which the reader may recognize as the standard value-matching condition exploited in partial di¤erential equation methods. The value-matching condition requires that the value of the net payo¤ upon exercise, EP t I, be equal to the value of the option, F t (EP; H; t 2 ).
Theorem 2 At each instant t prior to t 1 + , the optimal exercise boundary for the follower satis…es the equality 21) subject to the terminal condition B t 1 + = B 1 .
Since Eq. (21) is not analytically tractable, we resort to numerical methods for the determination of the follower's investment boundary. In Subsection 7.2 we report the Matlab function and its outer shell for the obtention of the boundary prior to t 1 + , as depicted in Figure 5 . The …xed cost of investment, I, is set equal to 100. The drift, , and the volatility, , of the demand process are equal to 0:02 and 0:05 respectively. The time-discount rate, r, is 0:05, the concavity parameter, , is 0:8 and the capital stock, , is equal to 1000. The quality-improvement factor is equal to 1.2 and the time-to-build delay, , is equal to 1. The investment horizon is discretized into 100 annual time steps. Figure 5 displays a monotonically decreasing pattern for the follower's boundary over the interval [t 1 ; t 1 + ]. As the time to maturity of the F option, t 1 + t, shortens, the demand level separating the continuation region from the immediate exercise region converges to the terminal value B 1 . This phenomenon …nds its justi…cation in the temporary reallocation of the leader's revenues upon exercise to its competitor. More speci…cally, the leader pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to the follower in the form of transferred consumer demand, as speci…ed in Eq. (5) . As a result, the follower's willingness to delay the initiation of its capital-replacement process decreases as the opportunity cost of investment, in terms of foregone monopoly pro…ts, declines over time.
Having determined the optimal policy for …rm 2, we now turn to …rm 1's problem. In the next Section we …rst solve the leader's problem and we subsequently determine, via comparative statics, the probability that the follower mimics the leader's decision within the leader's time-to-build window.
Firm 1' s Optimal Investment Behavior
In the previous Section we applied the standard Stackelberg mechanism for subgame perfect equilibria to derive the trigger boundary for …rm 2 conditional on …rm 1's investment policy t 1 . We now consider …rm 1's investment decision.
The leader …rm holds a perpetual American option with a strike price equal to I and it receives a ‡ow of revenues equal to
until it initiates its capital-replacement process. We denote the strategy space for …rm 1 by S 0;1 , the set of stopping times that take values between 0 and 1. For any t 1 2 S 0;1 the value of the leader's capital-replacement option is
The obtention of EP t , the value of the ‡ow of future revenues earned beyond t 1 + , is the object of the following Proposition.
Proposition 5
The value of the ‡ow of future revenues earned beyond time t 1 + when the option to replace the …rm's capital is exercised at time t = t 1 is equal to
which simpli…es to
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5 relies on the application of probabilistic methods often exploited in exotic option-pricing theory (e.g., Shreve, 2004) i and the payo¤s arising from knock-out and knock-in option portfolios, respectively. The latter aspect allows for signi…cant simpli…cations towards the derivation of a closed-form solution for EP t : recognizing the equivalence between the indicator function 1 fMv b ; (ẑv ẑt) kg and the di¤erence between the indicators 1 f(ẑv ẑt) kg and 1 fMv b ; (ẑv ẑt) kg permits us to express the value of the implicit knock-in option portfolio as the di¤erence between the value of a portfolio of zero-strike-price European calls and that of their knock-out counterparts. This equivalence is illustrated in the diagram below.
The reader is referred to the Appendix for a complete mathematical proof of Proposition 5.
As the reader can verify, Eq. (24) is identical to the value of future revenues earned by the follower beyond t 2 + , which is reported in Eq. (9) . Consequently, the expected appreciation in payo¤s, dA v , is common across …rms and is given by Eq. (12) . Furthermore, Eqs. (22) and (8), which contain the revenue ‡ows prior to investment for the leader and for the follower respectively, are identical. Thus, substituting Eqs. (22), (24) and (12) into the EEP formula yields
Since Eq. (25) is identical to Eq. (13), we appeal to Proposition 2 and we conclude that
Moreover, because all the expressions relevant to the pricing of the leader's investment option are identical to those leading to Proposition 3, the value of the leader's capital replacement option is given by Eq. (16) . Thus, Theorem 1 applies and yields the constant immediate exercise boundary B 1 equal toĨ 1 , with = p
2 and
. Accordingly, the value of the leader's investment option is
; a consequence of Corollary 1. Figure 6 below summarizes the equilibrium strategies for both the leader and the follower. It also introduces our study of the determinants of the probability that the follower emulates the leader's decision to invest within the leader's time-to-build window.
Figure 6 Optimal Investment Strategies: A Summary of the Game' s Equilibrium
Conditional on the leader having initiated its capital-replacement process, the follower's optimal strategy is to exercise its investment option the …rst time that X t reaches the trigger boundary B. Over the interval [t 1 ; t 1 + ], the trigger boundary for …rm 2 solves the recursive integral equation in Theorem 2, while beyond time t 1 + it assumes the form of B 1 stated in Theorem 1. Assuming exogenous roles, the leader invests in a full stock of higher quality productive capital the …rst time that X t reaches the boundary B 1 . This occurs at the random time t 1 . Beyond t 1 , the demand process continues to evolve stochastically, thereby originating a non-degenerate equilibrium distribution of investment times for …rm 2. Two sample realizations of the market demand process are depicted in Figure 6 .
Next we study the probability that the follower mimics the leader's decision to invest within the leader's time-to-build window: this is equivalent to determining the probability that the demand process X t attains the follower's boundary prior to t 1 + , which we de…ne as the probability of an investment cluster. Calibration: The investment horizon is discretized into D = 100 annual time steps. The benchmark parameters are I = 100, = :02, = :05, r = :05, = :8, = 1000. 30,000 paths are simulated. Table 1 shows that the probability of an investment cluster increases monotonically as the quality-improvement factor becomes large. For example, for equal to one year, this probability grows from 66.7% ( = 1:1) to 78.9% ( = 1:5) . Now consider the e¤ects of lengthening the time-to-build interval on the probability of an investment cluster, which entails two con ‡icting phenomena. First, as depicted in Figure 1 , increasing leads to an increased willingness to postpone investment. However, a second e¤ect is that increasing raises the likelihood of a substantial market demand growth prior to t 1 + . Table  1 demonstrates that the latter e¤ect is dominant: for instance, assuming a 20% quality enhancement upon capital replacement ( = 1:2), the probability of the follower rapidly emulating the leader ranges from 69% to 74,7% as varies from six months to two years and a half.
Thus, we conclude that both a higher expected quality advancement and a longer timeto-build phase make it more likely for the follower to exercise its investment option promptly. In Table 2 we consider the e¤ects of a higher expected demand growth rate, , and a higher market demand volatility, , on the probability of an investment cluster. Calibration: The investment horizon is discretized into D = 100 annual time steps. The benchmark parameters are I = 100, = 1:2, = 1, r = :05, = :8, = 1000. 30,000 paths are simulated. Table 2 shows that the higher the expected demand growth rate the more likely the occurrence of an investment cluster. This monotonic increase in probabilities re ‡ects the shape of the surface displayed in Figure 2 : if the follower expects higher market growth, it perceives the investment opportunity as more attractive at a lower current demand level. Assuming a market demand volatility equal to 0.05, the probability of an investment cluster grows from 60.1% ( = 0:01) to 87.9% ( = 0:0495). The e¤ect of a rise in demand volatility is twofold: …rst, higher market uncertainty increases the follower's reluctance to invest, as it is shown in Figure 2 , and second, increasing volatility improves the chances of the market demand growing substantially over the time-to-build interval. Table 2 demonstrates that the net e¤ect of increasing uncertainty is a reduction in the probability of investment clusters. When market demand is expected to grow at a rate equal to 0.02, the probability of a cluster falls from 99.3% ( = 0:01) to 63.9% ( = 0:2). Hence, we conclude that the probability of the follower emulating the leader prior to t 1 + is enhanced by a higher expected growth in market demand and it is weakened by added market uncertainty.
We conclude our probabilistic analysis of investment clusters by contrasting our results to Grenadier's (1996) . Grenadier develops a strategic real options game, which he solves via the partial di¤erential equation (PDE) approach. In Section 4 of his article, Grenadier conducts comparative statics to study the occurrence of development cascades in the real estate market. He …nds that the net e¤ect of increasing demand volatility is a decrease in the median time between the leader and the follower's investment executions. This result is at odds with our …ndings in Table 2 . We attribute this discrepancy to the relative simplicity of Grenadier's model, which does not produce a time-dependent trigger boundary for the follower such as those we obtain in Figures 5 and 6 .
Conclusion
In this paper we consider an economy populated by two symmetric …rms, each holding a unique capital-replacement option over an in…nite horizon. Until one of the two …rms exercises its capital-replacement option, both …rms operate the same technology. Upon exercising its investment option, a …rm is endowed with a full stock of higher-quality productive capital. We recognize that, under …xed costs of investment and time-to-build, a …rm's exercise of its capital-replacement option leads to a signi…cant temporary reallocation of the …rm's revenues to its competitor. To characterize each …rm's optimal exercise policy we rely on the early exercise premium (EEP) representation.
Finally, we solve the leader's problem and we determine, via comparative statics, the probability that the follower mimics the leader's decision within the leader's time-to-build window, which we de…ne as the probability of an investment cluster. We conclude that, while added market uncertainty reduces the probability of an investment cluster, a higher quality advancement upon investment, a higher growth rate in market demand, and a longer time-to-build phase, all make it more likely for the follower to exercise its investment option promptly.
Future venues of research extending the focus of this paper may include the introduction of capital depreciation, …rst-mover advantages as well as repeated capital upgrades and oligopolistic markets.
Appendix
The Section collects all lengthy mathematical derivations and proofs used in the body of the article.
6.1 Derivation of the Follower' s EP t EP t is the value of the future ‡ow of revenues earned by …rm 2 beyond time t 2 + when the option to replace the …rm's capital is exercised at time t = t 2 . Standard manipulations yield
Proposition 2
The follower's early exercise premium, EEP t , is equal to
Proof. We derive a pseudo closed-form solution for the value of the early exercise premium as a function of the unknown exercise boundary B v as in Kim (1990) , Jacka (1991) , and Carr-Jarrow-Myneni (1992). For any particular T , we have that
Proposition 3
The value of the European counterpart to the American contingent claim W t (EP; H; t 2 ) is
where d 1 is as in Proposition 2. Proof. We begin by evaluating the expectation in the …rst term of Eq. (15). This yields
which, in the limit as T ! 1, is equal to
We now consider the second term in Eq. (15) .
, we can simplify Eq. (27) and we obtain
in whichd
2 )(T t) p T t :
In the limit as T ! 1, Eq. (28) becomes
Therefore the value of the European component is
which, when combined with the result of Proposition 2, provides us with the value of the American option below.
Theorem 1
The immediate exercise boundary for the follower beyond t 1 + is given by B 1 =Ĩ 1 , in
Proof. In what follows, we rely on the proof of Corollary 35 in Detemple (2006, p.76 ) and on the proof of Eqs. (8) and (9) in Kim (1990, pp. 569-570) . The immediate exercise boundary solves the recursive non-linear integral equation
When T approaches 1 the immediate exercise boundary becomes time-independent: B = B 1 . It follows that
which is independent of B 1 . Accordingly, we can rewrite the …rst integral in Eq. (29) as
Letting u = v t, the above becomes 1 2 (r )
in which we use the identity
resulting from the change of variable x = p 2au where a = (r ) +
. Similarly, for the second integral becomes
With the same change of variables as above, u = v t, we obtain
2 )(1 t) p 1 t 0 + 1 2r
. Applying the identity in Eq. (30) yields producing the solution
2 , we conclude that
( e f( r) g 1) 
Corollary 1
Proof. The value of the follower's replacement option is obtained by replacing the B v with B 1 =Ĩ 1 , as derived in Theorem 1, in Eq. (16) , which yields
Letting u = v t, we obtain
This equation is analogous to the expression V (s) on page 570 of Kim (1990) . This allows us to apply the widely-known result for the value of the perpetual American option (Merton, 1973 , Kim, 1990 , and Detemple, 2006 )
Therefore, we conclude that the value of the follower's capital-replacement option at time t is equal to
Proposition 4
The value of the follower's capital-replacement option at time t 1 t t 1 + is given by
Proof. Recall from Eq. (18) that the follower's capital-replacement option prior to t 1 + is worth
We begin by solving for the explicit value of the option's European component
Using the result for dH t in Eq. (19) , it can be readily shown that
In order to solve for the second term, we partition the range of values that the market demand can take at time t 1 + . 
Let us consider the …rst conditional expectation.
In the above formula, we solve the two conditional expectations sequentially. The …rst expectation is
to which we apply the transformations Z t;t 1 + = ln X t 1 + ln X t and = t 1 + t:
We then rewrite the above expression as , we complete the square inside the exponential, which yields 
we obtain the closed-form expression
X t e f g ln B 1 ln X t ( + The last step in the determination of the F t (EP; H; t 2 ) option consists in evaluating the gains from early exercise, EEP t . More speci…cally, using the expressions for dH t in Eq. (19) and that for dA v in Eq. (12), Following the proof of Proposition 2, we integrate the above and we obtain 
Proposition 5
The value of the ‡ow of future revenues earned beyond time t 1 + when the option to replace the …rm's capital is exercised at time t = t 1 is equal to 2 1 X t e f( r) g r . Proof. Rearranging the expression for EP t in a suitable form for tractable analysis, we obtain We consider the three expectations separately. The …rst expectation is readily solved and is equal to
The second expectation, as well as the third expectation are solved via methods often applied to price exotic barrier options (e.g., Shreve, 2004) . These derivations are somewhat intricate, which motivates our detailed proof. Consider the second expectation and
